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a b s t r a c t
The paper provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of American stimulus policies aimed at
renewable energy (RE) technologies. We use an indicator-based methodology to assess progress with
respect to energy, environmental and socio-economic issues resulting from RE stimulus programs linked
to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and review and analyze the emerging but scattered
literature. Overall, our results indicate that stimulus programs have had a positive effect on the RE sector.
This is despite the fact that they were originally planned to work in combination with a greenhouse gas
‘cap-and-trade’ system, which has not been implemented. From the methodological perspective, our
approach is resource-intensive and our analysis highlights numerous challenges, notably related to
causality and additionality. Despite these limitations, this research improves our understanding of the
broad effects and impacts of RE stimulus programs.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
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1. Introduction
The 2008–2009 global ﬁnancial crisis increased policy attention
on the concepts of ‘Green Economic Growth’, the ‘Low-Carbon
Economy’, and a ‘New Green Economy’. Together with the sub-
sequent economic crisis – the worst in decades – the global
ﬁnancial crisis led to numerous economic pledges that aimed at
reforming the economy towards a path much less damaging to the
environment, society, and the economic system itself. Conse-
quently, economic recovery packages were implemented in
numerous countries to stimulate green growth, create jobs and
support low-carbon economies. These stimulus packages were
quickly portrayed as a golden opportunity to create a New Green
Economy, in which the green energy sector would play a vital role
[1]. Green (or low-carbon) energy was the target of recovery
packages in many countries, and China and South Korea soon
became the world leaders in green spending. In the United States
(U.S.), direct ﬁnancial support for clean energy technologies
accounted for approximately US$ 92 billion of the US$ 840 billion
included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
[2]. Of this, renewable energy (RE) accounted for approximately US
$ 21 billion. This direct ARRA spending was allocated to laying the
foundation for a green (or clean) energy economy.
While the ‘clean energy’ stimulus was the subject of much
attention, enthusiasm, and promise [3–7], there have been few
holistic evaluations of the performance of the policies that were
promoted or introduced as a result [8]. Our review of studies
shows that there is an emerging but rather fragmented body of
knowledge about the U.S. green energy stimulus programs. For
instance, Barbier [9] examined various energy efﬁciency policies
included in stimulus packages at national level (in general) and U.
S. stimulus policies (in particular). Other U.S. renewable energy
policies (mainly the Treasury 1603 program and Department of
Energy loan programs) have been evaluated in terms of stimulus
principles suggested by American economists, namely that they
should be “timely, targeted, and temporary” [10]. However, it has
been argued that the timely and temporary aspects have been
overstated, and that stimulus packages should be considered in
broader terms (see e.g. [11]). Similarly, other evaluations of U.S.
stimulus policies have focused on a few criteria that address only
one or two areas of a green economy (e.g. energy installations and/
or employment effects) [2,12–20]. While informative, our review
of this literature reveals that there has been no comprehensive ex-
post analysis of the U.S. stimulus package, and several questions
remain unanswered. For instance, how does the RE stimulus
package perform in broad terms? What are the critical conditions
or aspects that affect overall performance? What are the strengths
and limitations of the methods used to assess the inclusive
impacts of RE stimulus programs?
This paper provides answers to these questions and our
analysis provides a better understanding of the broad effects of
the RE stimulus program in practice. The objectives of this paper
are threefold. First, it provides an ex-post assessment of the
American ‘Green Economy’ stimulus policies addressing RE tech-
nologies. To that end, we present a wide-ranging empirical
analysis of their performance. Our approach encompasses key
areas related to a Green Energy Economy (GEE), which is hereby
deﬁned as the study of how an economic system can pursue
sustainable development through the expansion of green (or
clean) energy systems ad markets. Secondly, we review and bring
together the growing but scattered literature related to U.S.
stimulus programs that target RE. Where possible, we compare
ex-ante research with ex-post ﬁndings. Thirdly, and taking into
account the methodological challenges (details in the next sec-
tion), we discuss our key ﬁndings and the compatibility, reliability,
and measurability of the indicator-based method we applied. To
the best of our knowledge, the analysis presented in this study is
the ﬁrst application of a wide-ranging evaluation framework for
measuring progress towards a GEE at the national level. In turn,
our paper contributes to the emerging ﬁeld of ‘Energy-based
Economic Development’ [8].
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the
methodology, including the background and key details of our
case study. Section 3 presents the main ﬁndings. Results are
grouped according to the following dimensions: (i) energy, (ii)
environment, and (iii) economic and social aspects. In Section 4 we
discuss some key ﬁndings and the appropriateness of the analy-
tical framework in the light of our results and method. Finally we
draw some conclusions in Section 5.
2. Methodology and materials
An important challenge when assessing progress towards a
green economy has been the lack of consensus on an analytical
framework and indicators. Reports from international organiza-
tions such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
[21], the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) [22,23], the World Bank [24], and the International
Labor Organization (ILO) [25] that focus on green growth and the
green economy acknowledge the ambiguities and differences
between methods used to measure progress–in addition to con-
ceptual issues.1
Approaches to the evaluation of green economy policies range
from narrow considerations of job creation, patents [27], and
expenditure on green initiatives as a proportion of gross domestic
product (GDP) [28], to broader consideration of wider aspects of
sustainable development [22]. Many international organizations
have released reports on methodology [21,23–25], and many of
these reports focus on the use and development of so-called
1 For a comprehensive guide to publications by international organizations on
green growth and the green economy see Allen and Clouth [26].
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‘Green Economy Indicators’. This approach seems to have its roots
in the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (the Rio
þ20 Summit), in which Heads of State and their representatives
recognized the importance of developing indicators to measure
progress towards a green economy. This interest culminated in
April 2013 in the development of a platform and scoping paper
[29] for a standardized approach. The scoping paper outlines the
challenges and limitations of developing a framework, and pro-
poses a long list of multi-dimensional indicators that represent the
three pillars (social, economic, and environmental) of sustainable
development upon which the concept of the green economy
seems to rest [29].
2.1. Analytical framework
Like the scoping exercise conducted by representatives from
the Global Green Growth Initiative, the OECD, UNEP, and the
World Bank, our approach began with an in-depth examination of
existing frameworks for evaluating a green (energy) economy,
including sustainability aspects [30,31]. We also reviewed measur-
ing frameworks, methodologies and indicators developed on a
national level, with a particular focus on the U.S. [8,27,32–35],
together with the few examples of OECD green growth indicators
applied in other national contexts [21,23,36]. Overall, it appears
that indicator-based methods are increasingly used (or commonly
proposed) to measure progress towards a green economy, in
particular in the energy sector.
Amongst these analytical approaches, the energy-based eco-
nomic development (EBED) framework, proposed by Carley et al.
[8] proved the most suitable for our research in terms of suggested
dimensions, indicators and metrics. In this context, energy refers
to advanced, efﬁcient and/or clean energy, which leads to eco-
nomic development through changes to the energy system that
deliver economic, social and environmental beneﬁts [8,37]. As the
U.S. green stimulus programs were largely focused on energy, the
explicit deﬁnition of the term together with appropriate indica-
tors, were particularly relevant to our examination of a GEE.
Here, we build upon and modify the EBED framework; speci-
ﬁcally, as our focus is on renewable energy, energy efﬁciency
indicators are omitted. We also take into account other ‘green
economy’ and ‘clean energy’ indicators and frameworks, and
incorporate the following dimensions, indicators, and metrics:
Energy dimension:
 Renewable energy investments (government investments by
amount, % of stimulus, and type);
 Installed capacity (GW or MW) and generation ();
 Share of renewable energy (% of renewable in total energy
production/generation);
 Domestic manufacturing capacity (investment by amount;
domestic content %); and,
 Renewable energy patents (number by year and
technology type).
Environmental dimension:
 Reduction of CO2 emissions (t).
Socio-economic dimension:
 Job creation (number/year; job years);
 Access to renewable energy jobs/ job training (number and
demographics of trainees); and,
 Earnings, economic output (US$ dollars), returns (% return on
investments) and energy costs (levelized cost of renewable
electricity).
We were also guided by the Green Growth Knowledge Platform
(GGKP) scoping report [29] and OECD principles for the selection
of green growth indicators [22]. We thus used three criteria to
assess the degree of suitability and inclusivity of the proposed
indicator-based method. Policy compatibility focuses on the cover-
age of the key features of a green economy and here looked at
whether the evaluation method provides a balanced treatment of
the subjects under enquiry. Reliability addresses the consistency
and analytical soundness of the method, including its effectiveness
in communicating critical outcomes to stakeholders. Measurability
focuses on the complexity of input and output data, speciﬁcally
the intensity of data requirements.
2.2. Data collection
Data was collected from a variety of sources in order to improve
objectivity and reduce uncertainty. We reviewed the academic
literature and reports from international and national organiza-
tions on green economy metrics. We then constructed the analy-
tical framework, and reviewed primary and secondary data from
governments, independent reports and peer-reviewed literature
on ARRA programs and the RE sector.
We also conducted over 20 interviews with experts in the U.S.
to gather more data and discuss the ﬁgures, indicators and
performance of RE stimulus programs. In many cases we inter-
viewed the people who carried out the work used in our research;
for example, researchers at the Political Economy Research Insti-
tute (PERI), the World Resources Institute (WRI), the Climate
Policy Initiative (CPI), the Rhodium Group, the Information Tech-
nology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), and the BlueGreen
Alliance. We also interviewed advocacy groups and representa-
tives from industry, e.g. Green for All and the Solar Electric Power
Association (SEPA). Interviews were also conducted with govern-
ment ofﬁcials and researchers involved in speciﬁc ARRA programs
at the Department of Energy, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL),
and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL).
2.3. Case study: Renewable energy stimulus programs in the U.S.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was
passed in February 2009. The stimulus package included a ‘clean
energy’ or ‘green’ component of between US$ 67 and US$ 112
billion [38,39] and represented approximately 0.7% of GDP [28].
Depending on the deﬁnition of ‘green’, lower estimates tend to
focus solely on clean energy, while higher estimates include water,
waste and conservation funding. Government departments and
agencies generally estimate that US$ 92 billion of the overall US$
840 billion budget was appropriated for direct ARRA spending on
clean energy. Of this, RE accounted for approximately US$ 21
billion [2]. Programs and funding speciﬁcally targeted at RE
comprised 23% of ARRA clean energy spending and 2.5% of the
entire U.S. stimulus package.2
Along with the stimulus package and the 2010 budget, Pre-
sident Obama announced clean energy goals for the U.S. One was
to double the installed capacity of RE generation by 2012 [40] and
create over 300,000 jobs [41]. Another goal was to increase
domestic manufacturing capacity for renewable energy and pro-
vide jobs in renewable energy supply chains. However, it was
acknowledged that “it will take considerable outreach to make the
opportunity to work in a green job widely available” [42]. Conse-
quently, the stimulus package included training programs as a
2 In addition to the ARRA, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of
October 2008 and annual Federal budgets for 2010–2012 included clean energy-
related spending.
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pathway to RE and other green jobs. These Federal programs and
investments in basic research, development, and the deployment
of technology helped to bridge the so-called “valleys of death” in
innovation [43,44].
Some of the key RE programs that were supported by the
package and fall within the scope of our analysis are outlined
below:
2.3.1. Basic research programs
The stimulus package included funding for early-stage clean
energy innovation, research and development; the prime example
was the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) pro-
gram,3 which aimed to accelerate the pace of innovation in advanced
energy technologies. Both the stimulus package and the 2010 budget
boosted basic research through institutions such as the National
Science Foundation, which awarded research grants to numerous
universities and laboratories. The Department of Energy’s Ofﬁce of
Science also established 46 Energy Frontier Research Centers
(EFRCs)4 whose mission was to integrate talent and expertise and
accelerate advanced research into a clean energy economy [45].
2.3.2. Extension of production/investment tax credits (PTC/ITC)
The vast majority of stimulus spending was allocated to the
development of off-the-shelf technologies [46]. Historically, the
main incentives for renewable energy manufacturing in the U.S.
have been tax credits. Production tax credits (PTC) offer a 2.3-cent
per kilowatt-hour (kW h) incentive for the ﬁrst ten years of
operation. Investment tax credits (ITC) provide a 30% credit on
investments in solar energy, fuel cells and small wind, and a 10%
credit for investments in geothermal, micro-turbines, and com-
bined heat and power (CHP). These credits were initially part of
the 1992 Energy Policy Act, and they have expired and been
extended three times. The stimulus package extended these
credits; although different technologies had different expiry dates,
they were all extended for at least three years, which provided
longer-term market certainty (unlike the last-minute one year
extensions that had previously been put in place).
2.3.3. Cash grants (1603 program)
Many of the renewable energy businesses eligible for tax credits,
like the ITC and PTC, were too small or not proﬁtable enough to
fully monetize the beneﬁts, and third-party ‘tax equity providers’
had emerged to ﬁll the gap. However, these providers disappeared
during the recession, which spurred the introduction of the 1603
Program.5 This program offered cash payments (30% of the cost) for
RE properties in lieu of tax credits [47]; it was extended until 2011
and projects have until 2017 to become operational.
2.3.4. Tax credit for clean energy manufacturing (48C)
The stimulus package included a new tax credit program to
incentivize clean energy manufacturing (battery, vehicle, smart
grid, and RE). The Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit
(Section 48C)6 subsidized up to 30% of the cost of clean energy
manufacturing projects. The program was over-subscribed; there
were more than 500 applications for US$ 8 billion of funding, but
only US$ 2.3 billion of credits were made available. Credits were
allocated on the basis of factors including commercial viability,
domestic job creation, technological innovation, speed to project
completion, and potential for reducing air pollution and green-
house gas emissions [48].
2.3.5. Targeted loan guarantee (1705 program)
While the Department of Energy’s Loan Guarantee Program existed
before the stimulus package, ARRA added a new Section 1705 Loan
Program7 targeting renewable energy systems, power transmission
systems, and biofuels that commenced construction before September
30, 2011. Unlike the earlier Section 1703 Program (which was only
available for new or signiﬁcantly improved technologies), Section 1705
loans were available to projects that utilized commercial technologies;
they guaranteed not only the amount of the loan, but also credit
subsidies8 [49].
2.3.6. RE training grants
Stimulus funding was allocated to state agencies and non-proﬁt
organizations in order to support three programs that trained
workers for jobs in clean energy: the State Energy Section Partner-
ship (SESP), Pathways Out of Poverty (Pathways), and the Energy
Training Partnership (ETP).
2.3.7. Faster green patent processing
Technically, this program was not part of the stimulus package,
but it shared the goal of incentivizing RE. The U.S. Patent and
Trademark Ofﬁce’s (USPTO) Green Technology Pilot Program was
implemented in 2009 (and expired in 2012). The aim was to
accelerate the processing of green patents and speed up the
protection of clean energy technology [50].
3. Results
3.1. Energy dimension
3.1.1. RE investments
The RE stimulus programs themselves are indicative of the
major investment made by the U.S. government between 2009
and 2012 in the RE sector, in particular in solar and wind energy
technologies (see Fig. 1). Government investments also leveraged
private investment. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) 1705 Loan
Program guaranteed over US$ 16 billion; it attracted another US$
9.3 billion in private equity (in some cases attracting new investors
such as Google into renewable energy investment), and another
US$ 0.5 billion through co-lending with banks [51]. The DOE
argued that its leading role in certain types of innovative projects
increased private lending for similar projects [52]. By December
2013, the 1603 Program had awarded nearly US$ 20 billion in
Federal funding to 91,871 projects, rising to a total of nearly US$ 69
billion including private and government investment [53]. The
Section 48C clean energy manufacturing tax credit was awarded to
183 projects, leveraging private investment of up to US$ 5.4 billion
[48]. ARPA-E Deputy Director Cheryl Martin stated that the 17
companies which had received grants from ARPA-E had also
attracted over US$ 450 million in private investment [54].
3.1.2. Installed capacity and generation
New energy generation (or conversion) was incentivized; the
1705 Program supported one of the largest wind farms in the world
(Caithness Shepherds Flat in Oregon), the largest utility-scale
photovoltaic (PV) generation facility (Agua Caliente in Arizona),
3 For further details see 〈http://www.arpa-e.energy.gov/〉.
4 For further details see 〈http://science.energy.gov/bes/efrc/〉.
5 For further details see 〈http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Pages/
1603.aspx〉.
6 For further details see http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Advanced-Energy-
Credit-for-Manufacturers-(IRC-48C).
7 For further details see 〈https://lpo.energy.gov/programs/1705-2/〉.
8 A credit subsidy is the estimated amount that a loan guarantee will cost the
Federal Government and it is intended to protect the government against the risk
of estimated defaults or shortfalls in loan repayments.
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and the largest solar power plant in the world (BrightSource in
California) [49]. The 1603 Program incentivized small-scale and
distributed generation, particularly in solar energy, where nearly
76,000 projects received grants. The fact that these were cash grants
(rather than tax credits) made the programmore accessible to small-
scale project managers who were less likely to take advantage of ITC
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or PTC incentives [47]. As of March 2013, the 1603 Program had
supported an installed capacity of 27.1 GW (estimated to generate
67.7 TWh annually). The 21 renewable generation projects that the
1705 Program supported have an installed capacity of 6.1 GW and it
is estimated that they will generate 14.5 TWh annually when
completed (although all projects were required to begin construc-
tion by 30 September 2011, not all of them have become opera-
tional). Total capacity and generation resulting from the 1603 and
1707 programs are summarized in Fig. 2.9
Another impact of the stimulus to increase capacity and generation
is technological innovation. One example is the rapid growth in hub
height and rotor scaling, and increased efﬁciency in wind industry
technology since 2009, which has resulted in less energetic regions
becoming more viable for wind energy development [61]. Actual
wind generation grew from 55.4 TWh in 2008 to 138.7 by 2012.
By the end of 2012, the Obama administration’s goal of
doubling non-hydro renewable generation capacity had nearly
been met. Overall, non-hydro renewable generation capacity stood
at 43.5 GW in 2008; this had risen to 85.7 GW in 2012 [62]. In
2012, RE represented the single largest source of new capacity
growth, adding an extra 17 GW (13.2 GW from wind alone).
It has to be acknowledged that the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA) generation capacity models had predicted in
2009 a “signiﬁcant expansion in the use of renewable fuels for
electricity generation, particularly in the near-term” as a result of the
ARRA [63]. EIA predictions, and actual generation of non-hydro
resources, are shown in Fig. 3. Data revealed that EIA projections
overestimated RE growth; this was not only because they under-
estimated macroeconomic factors (such as the extent and depth of the
recession), but also because programs were originally intended to
work in combination with a greenhouse gas ‘Cap-and-Trade’ program.
3.1.3. Domestic manufacturing capacity
The Section 48C Program directly incentivized RE manufactur-
ing by awarding tax credits to over 150 applicants. Over US$
1.1 billion was awarded to 58 solar equipment manufacturing
facilities, accounting for nearly a third of selected projects (of the
total 183 successful applicants for the credits) [65]. Four loan
guarantees were awarded under the 1705 Program to solar
manufacturers, although two (Abound and Solyndra) subsequently
declared bankruptcy in response to the global crash in PV prices.10
By the end of 2011, 470 wind turbine manufacturing facilities were
located in the U.S., more than 10 times the number of such
factories in 2004 [67]. In particular, the domestic production of
wind turbine components rose from 2008 to 2012, while esti-
mated imports, which had been increasing rapidly prior to 2008,
dramatically decreased. The percentage of wind turbine equip-
ment manufactured domestically was estimated to have increased
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9 Beyond the U.S., other studies have highlighted increased capacity and
generation resulting from stimulus programs that address RE see e.g. [60]
10 Domestic manufacturing of solar technologies in the U.S. has been the
subject of protective tariffs and trade disputes with China see e.g. [66].
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signiﬁcantly: from 25% in 2006–2007 to 72% in 2012 [61,68].
Finally, two bioenergy projects received manufacturing tax credits;
one of which was focused on producing the biocatalysts (enzymes)
used in manufacturing cellulosic ethanol from corn stover.
3.1.4. Renewable energy patents
We found that stimulus programs incentivizing research and
development in the RE sector correlated with growth in the
number of RE technology patents issued by the USPTO from 2009
to 2012. Solar and wind technology patents rose the most drama-
tically, by a factor of 9 and 4, respectively (see Fig. 4). This growth
has been partially attributed to Federal RE stimulus programs [69].
Another reason for the increase in clean energy patents between
2009 and 2012 is the USPTO’s Green Technology Pilot Program that
was implemented in 2009. The program accelerated the processing of
‘green patents’ in order to protect clean energy technologies more
quickly. In turn, this led to increased private investment and techno-
logical progress [70]. By the time the program ended in March 2012, it
had granted 3,533green patents [50].
3.2. Environmental dimension
3.2.1. CO2 emission reductions
Ofﬁcial documents estimated an annual reduction in CO2
emissions of approximately 8.6 Mt due to the 1705 Program [49].
The EIA modelled the impact of RE tax incentives and 1603
Programs on energy-related CO2 emissions in the updated refer-
ence case (with ARRA). Emissions were projected to be lower than
in the no-stimulus case due to ARRA’s impacts on renewable
electricity generation and overall energy consumption. In fact,
actual emission reductions were far more dramatic than predicted
(Fig. 5). While RE played a role, other short-term factors were
highly inﬂuential. These included the economic crisis, fuel switch-
ing from coal to natural gas, decreased demand for transportation
fuels, and a mild winter in 2012 [71].
Aggregate ﬁgures from the Breakthrough Institute estimated
that in 2012, 34–102 Mt CO2 were displaced by a combination of
wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal energy. These ﬁgures were in
comparison to a business-as-usual counterfactual that only looked
at the power sector and used a range of 0.3–0.9 tCO2/MWh.
However, an analysis by the Rhodium Group found that RE played
an even greater role in the overall energy sector. They estimated
emission reductions from RE to be in the range of 270 Mt. Of this,
124 Mt CO2 were due to wind, 110 Mt CO2, to biomass and biofuels
and 18 Mt CO2 due to solar energy [72].
3.3. Socio-economic dimension
3.3.1. Job creation
In 2010, the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers estimated that
26,600 jobs were created by the ARRA RE and clean energy programs
(see Table 1). Ofﬁcial documents estimate that the 1705 Loan
Program supported 1,518 permanent and 13,733 construction jobs
[49].11 A more detailed preliminary analysis of jobs created by the
1603 Program for large wind and PV projects examined data up to
November 2011 (see Table 2). However, it must be stressed that such
jobs may not have been created solely as a result of grant funding,
nor do the ﬁgures consider the net effect of employment (i.e. if jobs
were lost elsewhere as a result) cf. [74].
The Brookings Institution and Battelle Technology Partnership
Program developed a clean energy database for tracking job growth
in the clean energy economy, which showed growth in both RE jobs
and in the clean economy as a whole [35]. They found that while
overall, clean energy sectors grew more slowly than the U.S.
economy from 2003 to 2010, young segments such as wind, solar
PV, and smart grid grew very quickly, albeit from a low baseline.
During the 2009 recession, renewable and clean energy-related jobs
grew much faster than the rest of the economy. This growth was
attributed in large part to the stimulus investments in clean energy
in 2009 [35].12 Notwithstanding causality or additionality effects
between the stimulus program and job creation, estimated ﬁgures
are in line with related RE employment studies in the U.S. [75–77].13
3.3.2. Access to RE jobs and job training
Although green job training programs were already in place
prior to the stimulus package, ARRA provided further funding.
These programs aimed to prepare individuals for jobs in green
industry sectors, including RE [80], which accounted for 37% of the
training provided (primarily in energy efﬁciency) [81]. US$ 500
million was allocated to programs that targeted populations that
were suffering most from the recession. The U.S. Ofﬁce of Inspector
General (OIG) reviewed the program; it assessed 97 grant-
Table 1
RE jobs related to the ARRA program.
Source: [2].
Direct and indirect jobs created
by clean energy spending
Jobs supported by clean energy programs
(includes induced jobs)
Total job years through 2012
Renewable energy generation 26,600 33,800 192,900
Clean energy manufacturing 800 900 9,500
Green innovation and job training 5,100 5,700 32,200
Table 2
Average jobs/year for large wind and solar PV projects under the 1603 program.
Source: [74].
Construction (2009–2011) Operation (annually for lifetime
of system)
Large wind 44,000–66,000 4,500–4,900
Solar PV 8,300–9,700 610–630
Total 52,000–75,000 5,100–5,500
11 The Obama administration set up a system to report jobs generated by
recipients of stimulus packages, including RE programs, with the objective of
measuring direct job creation and jobs saved, and making this information
transparent. However, the ofﬁcials we interviewed noted that recipients were
initially confused by the methodology used to measure saved/ created jobs.
Furthermore, they highlighted that reports are of limited use in calculating the
full employment impacts of ARRA investments as they only report jobs on a
quarterly basis (i.e. they are not cumulative) and they omit certain incentives (e.g.
tax incentives) and supply chain and other related jobs [73].
12 It is important to note that these are estimates of direct jobs in clean and
renewable industries. Estimates from the industry itself are considerably higher as
they also take into account indirect employment. For example, in 2008, the wind
and solar industries estimated 75,000 and 100,000 jobs, respectively, which had
risen to 85,000 and 119,000 by 2013.
13 For studies outside the U.S. see e.g. Sastresa et al. [78] and More and López [79].
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awarding bodies and conducted on-site audits at eight locations in
order to characterize participants and training, and measure
progress towards the program’s intended outcomes. Table 3 out-
lines the groups that took part in green job training programs up
to mid-2012. Most programs targeted both incumbent and unem-
ployed workers with the aim of up-skilling them in order to retain
their jobs during the recession [82]. The low numbers of women
participating in the program should be noted, despite the fact that
this group was a particular target. The challenge of recruiting
women to non-traditional industries was highlighted by grant-
awarding bodies, and both government and NGO programs
devoted extra resources to incentivize this group (e.g. WOW’s
Pink to Green Guide [83]). One potential barrier may have been
the nature of training programs themselves, which emphasized
on-the-job training that required cooperation with male co-
workers and supervisors, unlike the standards-based approach of
college degree programs [84]
3.3.3. Earnings, economic output, returns and energy costs
NREL’s in-depth analysis of the 1603 Program provides the
most detailed insight into earnings and total economic output
(Table 4) from RE projects such as PV and large wind projects. An
examination of the construction phase alone indicates that RE
stimulus programs resulted in an economic output for 2009–2011
equivalent to 1.2 to 2.1 the value of the US$ 21 billion allocated in
the ARRA stimulus package (Fig. 6).
Revenue from PV technology increased from nearly US$ 2.1 bil-
lion in 2010, up from US$ 941 million in 2009 [65]. The 1603
Program played a role in the growth of sales in the small wind
turbine sector (Table 5), although the Department of Agriculture
and state-level incentives also helped. PTC and ITC policies, 1603
grants, and the decline in turbine prices also improved the
economic attractiveness of wind energy, even in low wind speed
sites [85]. Federal incentives also inﬂuenced returns. For example,
the Shepherds Flat wind generation project (a recipient of a DOE
Table 3
Targeted and recipient groups.
Sources: [80,81].
Targeted groups Number of grantees targeting
this speciﬁc group (%)
Actual participation of this group out
of total participants served (%)
Unemployed 93 42
Incumbent workers 81 47
High school drop outs 69 6
Ex-offenders 41 9
Persons with disabilities 64 1
Auto workers 40 4
Low-income individuals 36 16
Women 60 16
Racial minorities 28 42
Table 4
Estimated earnings and economic output under the 1603 program.
Source: [74].
Earnings (US$ billions) Economic output (US$ billions)
Construction (2009–2011)
Large wind $7.70–12.00 $23.00–39.00
Solar PV $1.50–1.80 $3.50–$4.70
Total direct and indirect $9.20–$14.00 $26.00–$44.00
Operation (annual for lifetime of system)
Large wind $0.26–0.29 $1.60–1.70
Solar PV $0.04 $0.09
Total direct and indirect $0.30 $1.70–1.80
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Fig. 6. Estimated direct jobs in RE industries and the clean economy overall.
Source: [35].
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loan and other Federal and state incentives) provided investors
with a 30% return on equity [52].14 On the other hand, a decline in
U.S. sales in 2011 was partially attributed to inconsistent state
incentives and a weak economy [61].
Federal incentives inﬂuenced the levelized costs of electricity
(LCOE) for utility generation plants, thereby impacting the cost to
consumers. According to NREL’s analysis of various ﬁnancing
scenarios, the low-cost debt available under the loan guarantee
program had the potential to reduce LCOE by approximately 20%,
and possibly more, depending on the amount of debt allowed. The
authors examined some typical (rather than actual) cases and
found that DOE loans had the potential to reduce the levelized cost
of solar-generated electricity by about $0.025/kW h–$0.03/kW h
(17%) for concentrated solar power technologies, while PV projects
could realize savings of $0.02/kW h (15%) [88]. Federal incentives
were important in enabling renewable energy technologies to
compete with conventional fuel sources on a cost basis, particu-
larly given low natural gas prices (although it should be noted that
in many regions wind, geothermal, and biomass generation were
already competitive with coal and nuclear power) [89].
4. Discussion
4.1. Perceived beneﬁts
The perceived beneﬁts15 of RE investments triggered by the
stimulus package were an important aspect of whether they were
considered successful, regardless of any demonstrated progress
towards stated objectives (see e.g. [52,90,91]). For example, the
1705 Loan Program had multiple (and arguably, conﬂicting) goals
that left it vulnerable to criticism [13], both for putting public
money at risk and being too discretionary [10], and for being
overly conservative and risk-averse [35,43]. While most indepen-
dent reviews did not ﬁnd any examples of unacceptable risk in the
loan program’s investment portfolio, bankruptcies were widely
publicized by the media. In reality, bankruptcies (such as Solyndra)
represented a pool of failing companies that was smaller than
originally anticipated when the program was designed [12,13,92–
94]. However, the negative publicity tarnished similar, ongoing
loan programs, and the U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce
(GAO) noted that “the negative publicity makes DOE more risk-
averse or makes companies wary of being associated with govern-
ment support” [94]. Consequently, negative public perceptions
have tended to impede policy development, although objectives
have been met.
Other programs found it difﬁcult to meet their objectives, but
were nevertheless perceived as beneﬁcial. In particular, the Green
Jobs Program was contentious and subject to criticism from the
House of Representatives Committee of Oversight and Govern-
ment Reform [82,95]. The OIG was highly critical of the program’s
low reported success rate (38% of the stated goal) in placing
trainees in new employment [80]. However, it was argued that
access to training and preferential policies could not lead to jobs if
the sector did not grow as anticipated [14]. Instability in emerging
green industries and government incentives, together with unsui-
table strategies for the development of the workforce were
proposed as factors underlying the lack of success [16]. Evaluations
of training programs also noted the slow deployment of funds. The
time required for grants to be awarded, programs designed, and
participants recruited resulted in training taking place towards the
end, rather than the beginning of the stimulus. This meant that
many trainees were ready to join the workforce only after many of
the stimulus incentives had expired. Grant-awarding bodies found
that the “weak economy and changes in plans for Federal, state, or
local industry incentives or programs reduced the number of jobs
available in the target industries and made it difﬁcult for employer
partners to honor their commitments to hire program graduates”
[81]. This criticism of the program underscores themes found in
academic, government and industry literature concerning the
challenges of aligning supply and demand in emerging green
industry markets [16,33,80,81,84,96,97].
The Department of Labor’s Assistant Secretary responded to
this criticism, noting that many programs performed well in up-
skilling incumbent workers. She pointed out that over 90% of
workers retained their existing job rather than seeking new
employment [82]. Furthermore, Department of Labor representa-
tives noted that many training programs did not conclude until the
end of 2013, which was not reﬂected in employment ﬁgures
reported at the end of 2012. They also emphasized broader issues
such as qualitative data that highlighted the role of the training in
raising awareness and green thinking. On-the-job training in
energy audits had raised public awareness of this service and
increased demand from business. Even when trainees did not
pursue green jobs, their employers reported that they tended to
offer suggestions about how to ‘green’ the business, based on their
training. Similarly, the wider beneﬁts of training programs for both
individuals and communities were noted at a local level [73,97,98].
4.2. Social aspects revisited
There are at least three key aspects of social issues that merit
discussion: demographics, job quality and job distribution.
Regarding demographics, although the ARRA included a commit-
ment to transparent reporting (e.g. the recovery.gov website
reports jobs generated by Federal spending organized by depart-
ment, program, and congressional district), critics have pointed
out a lack of accountability in data related to the distribution of
funding to low-income and minority groups [99]. At the program
level there is no data that can be used to determine which
demographic groups gained most as a result of the RE stimulus.
A study modelling the jobs created following the ﬁrst two years of
operation (including energy efﬁciency programs) estimated that
about 20% of positions had been ﬁlled by Hispanics, 9% by African
Americans, and 24% by women [73]. Although speciﬁc demo-
graphic data is lacking for the RE sector, industry experts and a
forthcoming NREL study estimate that women make up 20–25% of
the workforce in the wind industry [100] and nearly 20% in the
solar industry [101].
An overall evaluation of the stimulus package found an
emphasis on the construction sector, where minorities and women
are under-represented [73,99]. However, there are indications that
Table 5
Sales of small wind turbines.
Sources: [61,68].
Year Number of
turbines
Capacity
additions (MW)
Sales revenue
(US$ Million)
2005 4,324 3.3 11
2006 8,330 8.6 36
2007 9,102 9.7 43
2008 10,386 17.4 74
2009 9,820 20.4 91
2010 7,811 25.6 139
2011 7,303 19.0 115
2012 3,700 18.4 N/A
14 Such high returns are unusual in the renewable energy industry [86]; 10–
15% is more normal [87].
15 Note that ‘perceived beneﬁts’ is one of the indicators suggested in the
literature (see [8]).
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the stimulus, combined with the Department of Labor’s policies to
strengthen and enforce Federal afﬁrmative action did result in
gains for some minority groups in sectors where historically they
have been under-represented. For example, ex-post analyses
showed an improvement in the number of women and Hispanics
employed in the construction industry, which was linked with
stimulus spending (the number of African–Americans also
increased, although the increase could not be attributed solely to
the stimulus) [18]. More detailed data at the program level may
show whether the stimulus had similar effects for under-
represented groups in the RE sector.
With respect to job quality, while there is some data related to
wages for the 1603 Program, there were few other indications of
the quality of jobs created or saved by the RE stimulus. Aggregated
data (for example from the Brookings Institution) indicated that
average salaries in the clean economy were higher than in the
economy as a whole (around US$ 44,000 compared to US$ 38,600)
[35]. More generally, we found that green and RE jobs were linked
to better career opportunities [16,102], but again no disaggregated
data was available in relation to RE stimulus programs. Although
green economy frameworks suggest the inclusion of indicators
pertaining to the level of education of jobs created or saved, we
only found macro-level data (e.g. 24% of RE workers have a
bachelor’s degree). Other job quality indicators found in frame-
works such as labor rights (union participation) were not found at
the program level, or for RE jobs in general.
In terms of job distribution, ex-post research [19] claimed that
the stimulus was poorly targeted to those in economic need,
despite the fact that one of the stated goals of the ARRA legislation
was “to assist those most impacted by the recession” [103]. This
research found the geographic distribution of stimulus funding
was more aligned with policy goals of advancing clean energy,16
medical and scientiﬁc research, repairing existing infrastructure,
and subsidizing state and local government services than with
helping those in economic hardship (i.e. areas with the highest
unemployment). While the authors acknowledged that spending
had stimulated employment and the economy at a macro level,
they argued that multiple policy goals resulted in trade-offs [19].
Here again, more detailed data at the program level would give a
better picture of whether RE spending did reach those areas
experiencing the greatest hardship.
4.3. Policy learning
While the stimulus was designed to have temporary and short-
term effects, there were longer-term impacts. One such impact
that was not captured by the framework, but was found in our
interviews, was policy learning. The ARRA represented a new
approach to RE incentives, particularly in offering cash grants
through the Treasury and the expansion of the role of the
Department of Energy. This led to the innovative use of limited
resources, effective processes for controlling fraud [104] and
public-private partnerships [105]. The DOE hired Wall Street
veterans, and its loan ofﬁce developed a project ﬁnance team that
invested more in green energy than the next ten largest American
funds combined [52]. While the role proved controversial, we
would argue that the increased experience and knowledge of clean
energy ﬁnancing expanded the department’s capacity.
Similarly, the experience gained by the Treasury in assessing
1603 tax credits is now used by the Internal Revenue Service in its
administration of tax credit programs. The approach taken by the
1603 Program also initiated discussions about alternatives to the
PTC and ITC that could provide the same incentives for less cost
see e.g. [106]. Innovation in clean energy ﬁnancing continues to be
of keen interest to policymakers [62].
Moreover, the Department of Labor used the ARRA program to
fund Labor Market Information (LMI) grants for research into the
labor market for green jobs, and identify the skills needed for
these jobs, in the hope this would lead to a better match between
supply and demand (as discussed earlier [107]).
4.4. Assessing the undertaken method
4.4.1. Policy compatibility
One can safely argue that the method has the potential to cover
a very wide range of green economy issues. The indicator-based
method conveys, simply and clearly, a wide range of complex
issues that were affected by the RE components of the ARRA
package. Although it was relatively easy to capture the energy and
economic dimensions of the RE stimulus, establishing causation
and additionality remain signiﬁcant challenges (details below).
The chosen indicators help to measure and illustrate (relative)
progress. Where data is available, historical trends and changes
associated with RE stimulus programs support a better under-
standing of the aggregated determinants of clean energy efforts. If
‘intensity’ indicators are used (e.g. the ratio of energy use or CO2
emissions to economic output), careful policy consideration is
required. This is because intensity indicators are often linked to
the issue of ‘decoupling’, which refers to a situation in which
resource or environmental impacts decline relative to economic
growth (e.g. greenhouse gas emissions may rise, but more slowly
than GDP). One can argue that if the RE stimulus aimed to prevent
dangerous impacts on the climate, CO2 emissions must be reduced
in absolute terms; in other words, they must not be allowed to
continue to rise, even at a slower rate than GDP. In addition, as the
Green Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP) acknowledges, “more
detailed information may be needed when indicators are meant to
support sub-national or sectoral decision making” [29]. Indeed,
many of the aggregated indicators at the international level (e.g. as
a ratio or percentage of GDP) may be unhelpful in assessing
country, sector or issue-speciﬁc policies (and the relationship
between them) in more depth.
4.4.2. Reliability
The approach has proved useful in estimating the scale of the
deployment and environmental beneﬁts (e.g. decreased green-
house gas emissions) that can be associated (if not directly
attributed) to the RE stimulus program. Although both our sources
and methodology are transparent, they still require careful con-
sideration in the interpretation and communication of the ﬁnd-
ings. For example, the reliability of economic and employment
data varied. Challenges were compounded in the socio-economic
and social dimensions by a lack of data at the sector and program
level (e.g. economic output) and different approaches to estimat-
ing employment. Comparing results from different studies pre-
sented even greater challenges in the economic and social
dimensions due to the multiple methods and interpretations of
indicators. As the GGKP report highlights, the choice of indicators,
the level of aggregation, organization within dimensions, and their
explanatory power differ according to the context they are applied
in; it also acknowledges that indicators often “tend to simplify the
underlying reality” [29]. It is important to note that many of the
indicators we present are inﬂuenced by the local context, state-
level policies (e.g. renewable portfolio standard quotas), and global
trends (e.g. the dramatic fall in the price of PV technology
globally), that are beyond the scope of national policies.
16 It should be noted that the authors use ‘Centers of Science and Technology’,
i.e. universities and research institutions, as a proxy for the distribution of clean
energy funds. However, our research suggests that most RE funding was allocated
to deployment rather than research, and this aspect is not examined in detail.
L. Mundaca, J. Luth Richter / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 42 (2015) 1174–1186 1183
Furthermore, the lack of data and a straightforward counterfactual
(s) makes it more difﬁcult to establish causality and additionality
of particular policies with particular outcomes. While here we
present the most up-to-date data for the U.S., we acknowledge
that there are difﬁculties at the national level for some indicators.
Further improvements in the design of policies for monitoring and
collecting this data would improve their evaluation.
4.4.3. Measurability
The approach is very data-intensive and related uncertainties
are unavoidable. There is a great need for disaggregated data and
counterfactual(s) (e.g. what would have happened in the RE sector
in the absence of stimulus programs?) to better understand
causation between individual programs and their performance
via indicators. We found that the development of counterfactuals –
the so-called ‘evaluation problem’ [108] – is critical in ascertaining
the ‘additional’ component of the stimulus programs and the
robustness and sensitivity of their impacts. Another key challenge
relates to disentangling the effects of policy instruments that
target RE from the speciﬁc effects of RE stimulus programs—the
so-called ‘impact problem’ in policy evaluation [109]. The chal-
lenge of de-linking the effects of different policy instruments
depends heavily on data disaggregation. We also found that data
from individual programs overlapped. Furthermore, the method
requires that policies set speciﬁc targets in order to ascertain
effectiveness, but these targets not always deﬁned in such a way
that makes them measurable. The RE stimulus was comprised of
several programs, each with a different goal (and sometimes more
than one) and spending attempted to address both the transition
to a green economy and the recession. However, there was a lack
of clearly deﬁned ways to measure effectiveness. Some data was
collected, beyond energy installation and general job estimates,
which made the ex-post application of a green economy frame-
work a difﬁcult task. Finally, some indicators, particularly in the
social dimension, were both vague and difﬁcult to measure and
remain a challenge in assessing progress towards a GEE.
5. Conclusions
This paper provides a comprehensive ex-post assessment of
stimulus policies addressing RE technologies in the U.S. Our
analysis brought together the emerging, but fragmented literature
concerning the performance of RE stimulus programs linked to the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The approach
attempted to capture the full range of Green Energy Economy
(GEE) areas that stimulus programs focused on (e.g. technology
development, innovation, CO2 emission reductions, job creation).
We used a range of indicators in our evaluative framework in order
to capture these aspects.
Overall, and from a holistic perspective, our ﬁndings suggest
that the stimulus programs had a positive effect on the RE sector.
With due uncertainties the ﬁndings revealed signiﬁcant (or
immediate) growth in investments, installations, and contribution
to the energy supply from RE sources. ARRA-speciﬁc projects
played a signiﬁcant role in new RE installations. The stimulus
programs helped to boost manufacturing capacity and the RE
supply chain, particularly for large wind (where domestic manu-
facturing supports stable deployment through logistical savings
[110]). While RE played a role in CO2 reductions, other short term
factors, notably the economic crisis, were also highly inﬂuential in
decreasing emissions from energy [71]. This in turn contributed to
a decline in CO2 emissions and carbon intensity. Estimates indi-
cated positive employment effects and increased revenue in the RE
sector. However, with so many different programs, each with a
different focus there was also evidence of misalignment and
missed opportunities for them to work together. For example,
the development of RE technology was incentivized early in the
stimulus, while more time was needed to train employees for the
new jobs associated with its deployment.
It is also important to highlight that the stimulus programs we
examined were originally intended to be combined with a green-
house gas ‘Cap-and-Trade’ program, which may have increased RE
investment, even after short-term incentives had expired.
Although this short-term spending will no doubt have long-term
impacts, and has set the stage for a green energy transition, the
impacts of the RE stimulus are not in and of themselves enough for
the large-scale transformation needed. We found numerous stu-
dies that stressed the need for a sustained RE policy [37, 111, 112].
The long-term effects across the energy system remain to be seen
and examined, which emphasizes the need for policy evaluation.
From the methodological perspective, our research highlighted
numerous challenges (e.g. ‘impact’ and ‘evaluation’ problems) in
evaluating and assembling indicators at the same level of analysis,
together with areas for data development. Our experience of this
indicator-based approach showed that it is both time- and
information-intensive. To address additionality, the approach
requires counterfactual(s) and disaggregated data to cover all
aspects of the GEE. Our results indicate a need for numerous
indicators that can capture and characterize the multiple attri-
butes of the GEE and the context in which related policy instru-
ments work. The measurement of social indicators can become a
crucial challenge when programs do not adequately address or
support their assessment (e.g. when there is no program-level
data or when aggregate or macro-level data cannot be correlated
with programs). However, these issues are part of the challenge of
the evaluation and not a deﬁciency of the approach as such.
Asymmetric information made the evaluation complex, but pos-
sible. As more countries implement policies that promote a GEE, it
is necessary to be able to adapt indicators for different purposes,
priorities, and scales. The approach adopted by international
organizations provides guidance concerning the various dimen-
sions that should be included in order to form a comprehensive
and accountable picture. Although (comprehensive) GEE policy
evaluation is likely to be a complex, challenging and resource-
intensive process, it is a valuable exercise that offers ongoing
policy learning and opportunities for policy improvements.
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